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Plea Bargaining is a Shadow Market
Frank H. Easterbrook*
I need to begin with an apology for appearing by what TV used
to call tape delay. Dean Gormley asked me to attend the confer-
ence in the flesh, but a combination of postal problems and com-
peting commitments made that impossible. Still, it's the sort of
academic gathering that interests me. One of my first scholarly
essays concerned plea bargaining, which operates at the boundary
of the criminal process and the economic system.' That essay was
written more than thirty years ago. For more than twenty-five
years, I've been patrolling that boundary in the hope that we
judges can do more good than harm. Although one may doubt the
outcome of many a decision, including my own, I think that these
rules, created in common-law fashion, have been generally benefi-
cent. So I recorded this talk in Chicago, and a video took the In-
ternet to Pittsburgh.
The schedule does not give me much time, but I don't need much
because most of what I have to say is just what any student of
markets would say-though I do have a few comments about the
interaction of plea bargaining and the law of ineffective assis-
tance.
Plea bargaining is a form of contract, and its regulation through
the common-law process is fundamentally no different from the
way courts treat other contracts. People bargain to advance their
view of their interests. We judges must be careful not to override
real people's actual views about their actual interests in favor of
what judges think those views and interests ought to be. We serve
best by preventing fraud and ensuring that bargains reflect volun-
tary decisions.
To put this differently, proposals to regulate plea bargaining
have the same limitations and consequences as proposals to regu-
late commercial contracts. Ban it, and it continues but goes un-
derground, as in many states before they gradually recognized its
* Chief Judge, United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit; Senior Lectur-
er, The Law School, The University of Chicago. @ 2013 by Frank H. Easterbrook. This
essay began as a remote oral presentation, and I have not tried to change its character.
1. Criminal Procedure as a Market System, 12 J. LEGAL STuD. 289 (1983).
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legitimacy during the 1960s and 1970s. Black markets predomi-
nate when lawful markets are forbidden-but black markets are
characterized by less information, more fraud, and few guarantees
of voluntary action. Far better to acknowledge the practice and
get the terms in writing; contract law has a Statute of Frauds for
very good reason.
People are bound to bargain. Defendants are risk averse and
prefer the certainty of a year in prison to a 50/50 or 90/10 chance
of a longer term. For many defendants the rights afforded by
rules of criminal procedure have little value at trial but considera-
ble value in trade; they can sell their rights back to prosecutors by
dealing for shorter sentences through a guilty plea. Prosecutors
have limited budgets and want to induce guilty pleas so that they
can bring more cases, using the resources released when they
don't have to take each defendant to trial. Both sides gain. So
does society. It's as if there were an invisible hand ...
Try to regulate one contractual term and others adjust. In
commercial law, if a regulator sets the price term, then quality
terms adjust-and, to be clear, judges are the regulators with the
broadest portfolios, and thus the least knowledge, because we are
not specialists. If regulators try to set not price but quality, price
adjusts. If regulators try to set price and quality, something else
adjusts. Self-interested people are determined, and lawyers are
clever.
It is easy to use the legal system to set one or another term but
almost impossible to use the power to make either side better off.
As one of my judicial colleagues wrote:
The idea that favoring one side or the other in a class of con-
tract disputes can redistribute wealth is one of the most per-
sistent illusions of judicial power. It comes from failing to
consider the full consequences of legal decisions. Courts de-
ciding contract cases cannot durably shift the balance of ad-
vantages to the weaker side of the market; they can only
make contracts more costly to that side in the future, because
[the other side] will demand compensation for bearing oner-
ous terms.'
That's as true of contracts about criminal punishment as it is of
commercial contracts. As a result, no one should have been sur-
2. Original Great Am. Chocolate Cookie Co., Inc. v. River Valley Cookies, Ltd., 970
F.2d 273, 282 (7th Cir. 1992).
Vol. 51552
Shadow Market
prised that, when the Federal Sentencing Guidelines tried to regu-
late how much of a discount could be given as part of a plea bar-
gain, charge bargaining ensued-and judges cannot regulate
which charges prosecutors bring or pursue.
Of course the terms of trade differ from those in economic mar-
ketplaces. People are not exchanging goods for money. They are
exchanging probabilities of acquittal (which depend on the rules of
evidence and the parties' procedural entitlements) for time in
prison. But trades of intangibles are hardly unique. Insurance
contracts also deal with risks rather than goods, as to financial
contracts. Risks and rewards can be mapped to the parties' utility
functions, so intelligent trades are possible.
What law can contribute is a framework for Pareto-superior
deals, just as one of the common law's great achievements has
been the establishment of reliable rules for making and enforcing
commercial contracts. Economists who study growth have con-
cluded that having a common-law system willing to enforce con-
tracts reliably is the best predictor of which nations' economies
flourish and which do not.4 Similarly, Professor Oliver suggested
in a recent essay in the Cato Supreme Court Law Review,' and in
his contribution to this symposium,' that a common-law infra-
structure can make plea bargaining more productive. I agree.
I don't think that building this infrastructure is a matter of con-
stitutional law, however. Decisions taken in 1787 and 1791 about
the criminal process do not speak to the management of plea nego-
tiations. These details are for the living-living rule-writers, liv-
ing judges, and living legislators. Pretending that the grand gen-
eralities of the Constitution resolve them just exposes judges to
ridicule. I'll come back to this.
It also seems to me that problems often attributed to plea bar-
gaining have some other genesis. We need to fix those problems,
not the system by which people bargain in the law's shadow.7 If
defendants have bad lawyers, offer compensation high enough to
3. See, e.g., In re United States, 503 F.3d 638 (7th Cir. 2007).
4. Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes & Andrei Shleifer, The Economic Con-
sequences of Legal Origins, 46 J. ECON. LIT. 285 (2008), summarize a large and growing
literature. See also Kristina Nystr6m, The Institutions of Economic Freedom and Entre-
preneurship: Evidence from Panel Data, 136 PUB. CHOICE 269 (2008).
5. Wesley M. Oliver, The Present and Future Regulation of Plea Bargaining: A Look at
Missouri v. Frye and Lafler v. Cooper, 2011-12 CATO SUP. CT. REv. 257 (2012).
6. Wesley M. Oliver, The Indirect Potential of Lafler and Frye, 51 DUQ. L. REV. 633,
640 (2013).
7. I expand on this in Plea Bargaining as Compromise, 101 YALE L.J. 1969 (1992).
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attract better quality. If prosecutors overcharge, compensate de-
fendants who prevail at or before trial, or who have convictions set
aside. It is scandalous that our legal system offers fee-shifting for
age discrimination cases brought by over-the-hill salesmen, but
leaves persons put upon by unjustified criminal charges, who vin-
dicate their civil right to liberty, entirely to their own devices, so
that they emerge from the process broken and impoverished. The
Equal Access to Justice Act' reimburses defendants if the govern-
ment brings unjustified civil litigation, but there's nothing compa-
rable for unjustified criminal prosecutions.' Government must do
better.
Similarly, if, like Professor Alschuler, you think the plea deci-
sion is defective because it was made in the shadow of abusive
prosecutions and Draconian sentences following conviction at tri-
al,10 you should fix that problem rather than try to interfere with
defendants' ability to make the best they can of a bad position.
Lots of federal judges, including me, support Professor Alschuler's
view that many prosecutions are abusive (think honest-services
fraud and the ways RICO has been stretched) and that statutory
minimum sentences are too high. 1 You will even find that some
judges, including me, think that many drugs should be removed
from the criminal law and regulated as tobacco and alcohol are
regulated,12 and that many federal criminal statutes should be
8. 5 U.S.C. § 504 (2006).
9. I have not overlooked 28 U.S.C. §§ 1495 and 2513, which offer some prospect of
compensation to federal defendants who can obtain certificates of innocence. Section 2513
makes these scarce by requiring the defendant to show not only vindication but also actual
innocence. Many a criminal case should never have been brought, yet trying to prove inno-
cence may be impossible.
10. Albert W. Alschuler, Lafler and Frye: Two Small Band-Aids for a Festering
Wound, 51 DUQ. L. REv. 673, 692-95 (2013).
11. Objections to minimum sentences are widespread. The Judicial Conference of the
United States has called for their modification or repeal; so has the Sentencing Commis-
sion. And the Supreme Court has done its bit to rein in vague and overly creative readings
of criminal statutes, see Skilling v. United States, 130 S. Ct. 2896 (2010); McNally v. United
States, 483 U.S. 350 (1987), though Congress responded to McNally and some other deci-
sions by enacting new, vaguer, and thus even easier to misuse language.
12. My reasons are fundamentally those given by John Stuart Mill in ON LIBERTY
(1859) and reiterated by Milton Friedman when he endorsed decriminalization (see Jeffrey
A. Miron, Milton Friedman, 500+ Economists Call for Marijuana Regulation Debate,
PROHIBITIONCOSTS.ORG (last visited Apr. 24, 2013), http://www.prohibitioncosts.org): the
government should not prohibit acts that do not injure third parties. "Victimless crimes"
should not be crimes at all. They fill prisons at great cost to taxpayers (and to the economy)
as well as to liberty, and they cause violence that does injure third parties. Because drug
dealers can't use the courts to protect their businesses, they use guns instead and bribe the
police to look the other way. Did this nation really learn so little from its experience with
the prohibition of alcohol?
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repealed and the subjects returned to the states. It is hard to get
legislatures to reduce penalties, let alone decriminalize swaths of
human conduct, but that's where the effort should lie. Plea bar-
gaining just allows defendants to ameliorate a predicament be-
yond their control;13 defendants cannot be made better off by limit-
ing their options.
Other proposals have less prospect of assisting defendants.
Think of mandatory disclosure. There's already a good deal of this
in criminal procedure (think Rule 16 of the Federal Rules of Crim-
inal Procedure and state analogs). Many prosecutors open their
files, seeing it as a way to induce pleas. And reducing the uncer-
tainty about what the evidence will show brings the sides together
in criminal bargaining, just as in civil settlements.
Defendants who want more information can insist on it; prose-
cutors want pleas, indeed need pleas, so information will be forth-
coming if there is a demand for it. But forcing information on the
defense won't help. Remember United States v. Ruiz,14 in which
the prosecutor had a fast-track program offering deep sentencing
discounts in exchange for a speedy plea with no discovery and no
appeal. The Ninth Circuit held that defendants could get both the
discount and disclosures that might help set up a defense at trial.
The Supreme Court reversed, for what the Ninth Circuit had done
was to destroy the fast-track program. Disclosure is one of those
entitlements that may be waived-and, as Ruiz observed, the con-
stitutional entitlement to exculpatory information is a trial right
rather than a discovery right. Tinkering could make things worse.
The Ninth Circuit did make them worse, helping one defendant
but injuring thousands of others; defendants should be glad that
the Supreme Court saved their bacon.
I'm sure that most of you could have predicted that I would say
everything that I've just said. So let me turn from the economics
of bargaining to the holdings of Frye and Cooper, which led to this
conference." Perhaps you expect me to toe Justice Scalia's line,
thinking that textualists have a mutual-support pact, but I don't
see things the way he did.
The dissent in those cases went astray by concentrating on
whether there is a "right to plea bargain." Counsel's job is to en-
13. People can of course control what acts they commit; my point is that defendants
cannot control whether criminal laws are too vague, sentences too high, or prosecutors and
judges too creative in extending the laws' reach.
14. United States v. Ruiz, 536 U.S. 622 (2002).
15. Missouri v. Frye, 132 S. Ct. 1399 (2012); Lafler v. Cooper, 132 S. Ct. 1376 (2012).
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force, for defendants' benefit, whatever rights exist under law or
practice. So if the statute of limitations is five years, and the de-
fendant is indicted a day late, counsel must assert the period of
limitations unless the client waives it; no one would think to ask
whether any given statute of limitations was constitutionally re-
quired. (This is why, even though the exclusionary rule cannot be
enforced on collateral review,16 a lawyer's failure to invoke the ex-
clusionary rule in state court may be the basis of federal collateral
review.")
My evaluation of Frye and Cooper concerns two subjects that the
majority and dissent alike ignored, and a third that rarely gets
attention-the level of generality. First, the remedy the majority
supplied makes a defendant better off than if he had accepted the
offer. Frye and Cooper went to trial and might have been acquit-
ted. They were convicted and then tried to take the offers. Yet
the prosecutors' offers provided a discount only because they ex-
changed the defendants' rights for the certainty of conviction. To-
tal anticipated punishment is lower if you take a chance at out-
right acquittal and then take the offer. Equivalently, once you
have had and missed a chance at acquittal, the terms of the offer
will be less favorable." Any remedy that makes an accused better
off than either trial or plea is hard to approve and cannot be sta-
ble. If Frye and Cooper give some defendants an opportunity to
16. Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976).
17. Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 U.S. 365, 372 (1986); Owens v. United States, 387
F.3d 607 (7th Cir. 2004). I doubt, however, that a federal court could use an attack on
counsel's performance to review the substance of a Fourth Amendment contention indirect-
ly if the state court finds that counsel's performance was adequate because the exclusionary
rule does not apply, or that the police complied with the Fourth Amendment, making futile
a motion to suppress. See Rann v. Atchison, 689 F.3d 832 (7th Cir. 2012).
18. Suppose the probability of conviction after a trial is 0.9. Suppose too that by plead-
ing guilty and releasing resources that the prosecutor can use to charge someone else, the
defendant can achieve a discount of 50% from the result expected at trial. Finally, suppose
that a given charge, if it leads to conviction at trial, would yield a sentence of 10 years'
imprisonment. If the defendant goes to trial, the expected punishment is 9 years. If he
pleads guilty, the expected punishment is 5 years. But if he first goes to trial and is con-
victed, and then is allowed to take the original bargain, the expected punishment is only
4.5 years. (In 10% of the tries, the accused will be acquitted and not punished; in the other
90% the punishment will be 5 years; the expected value of the two in sequence is 4.5 years.)
Prosecutors could well respond to this by reducing the proffered bargain, so that defendants
who initially plead guilty must serve 60% of the sentence that would have been imposed
after conviction at trial. This would preserve aggregate deterrence, but the price would be
paid by those defendants who get good legal advice, and hence can't take advantage of Frye
and Cooper. That hardly seems like the set of people who should pay the price for others'
earlier release.
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play this game, then the terms of all offers to all defendants will
be worse, ex ante.
Second, these decisions continue the sequence of cases-of
which Padilla v. Kentucky' is another-that bootstrap regulation
of plea bargaining from the Sixth Amendment right to the assis-
tance of counsel. The court is adding many details-and every one
of these decisions spawns new questions. For example: does it
matter after Frye if the offer is oral? Does the defendant have a
right to be competent when the offer is conveyed?2 0 A right to un-
derstand the offer's significance fully? To do that, he would have
to have gone to law school and know the latest findings in the
Journal of Empirical Legal Studies. Henry Friendly doubted that
the Bill of Rights is a code of criminal procedure.2 1 I share his
skepticism. What's happening now, just as it was in the days of
the Warren Court, is that the Sixth Amendment, a generality, is
being used as a fount of details that cannot plausibly be imputed
to it.2 2 Far better to be candid that the common law is at work,
and to apply it through rules devised for the conduct of judges
than rules devised for the conduct of defense lawyers.
The Court has fundamentally changed the law of ineffective as-
sistance without seeing what it is doing-because the lawyers
have not called the change to its attention. The idea in Strickland
v. Washington23 was that the Sixth Amendment speaks of "coun-
sel," so it is necessary to determine whether the person assisting
the defendant is one of these or a mere poseur. But that is a ques-
tion about the quality of the agent, not the details of the represen-
tation. Strickland made that plain by saying that the entirety of
representation must be examined, and that the ultimate issue is
whether the defendant had the sort of "counsel" of which the Con-
stitution speaks.24
Later decisions establishing specific duties-such as Padilla,
which held that defense counsel must give immigration advice-
19. 559 U.S. 356 (2010).
20. See Overstreet v. Wilson, 686 F.3d 404, 406-07 (7th Cir. 2012).
21. Henry J. Friendly, The Bill of Rights as a Code of Criminal Procedure, 53 CALIF. L.
REV. 929 (1965).
22. Despite what the Court said in Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938), this clause
does not even apply, because it does not create a right to free counsel, any more than the
First Amendment creates a right to free newspapers. The text of the Sixth Amendment
says that, if you have a lawyer, the state can't keep him out. Whether the trial itself is
adequate to separate the guilty from the innocent is better analyzed under the Fifth
Amendment.
23. 466 U.S. 668 (1984).
24. My court expanded on this in Williams v. Lemon, 557 F.3d 534 (7th Cir. 2009).
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are unmoored from both Strickland and the Constitution's text.
They don't ask whether the lawyer was competent enough to count
as "counsel." They don't examine the totality of work done. In-
stead, they add to the Code of Criminal Procedure that is being
developed in the Constitution's shadow, though not as an interpre-
tation of its text. Rules of criminal procedure should be derived
from the Constitution's substantive norms, not indirectly through
duties imposed on counsel, or they should be left to legislators and
rule writers who are accountable to the people.
The Court's approach raises questions of legitimacy, given the
rationale of Marbury,25 which limits judges to enforcing real rules
of law.26 To take matters out of legislative hands, a rule must be
in the Constitution--encoded in a way that puts it beyond the
choice of the living. What's going on here, however, is that Justic-
es are changing the level of generality from the abstract to the
concrete. Filling in details is a necessary task, but why does it
belong to the Court in a way that the legislature cannot review?
When there's a general statute, the Court goes exactly the oppo-
site way: the agency, not the judiciary, gets extra scope for
choice.27 The Justices have never tried to reconcile their claim to
have exclusive authority to fill in details in the Constitution with
the way Chevron works for statutes. When We The Living People
must elaborate on the plan, The Living are entitled to speak
through their elected or appointed representatives, free of imposi-
tions by people who cannot be thrown out of office.
I hope I have given you some provocative thoughts. I'm sorry
that I can't be among you to work through them.
25. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (1803).
26. 1 expand on this thought in Abstraction and Authority, 59 U. CHI. L. REV. 349
(1992), and Textualism and the Dead Hand, 66 GEo. WASH. L. REV. 1119 (1998).
27. See Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984),
and my essay Judicial Discretion in Statutory Interpretation, 57 OKLA. L. REV. 1 (2004).
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